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THE RULE-MAKING POWER OF THE COURTS
IN LOUISIANA*
Albert Tate, Jr.**
Within the past year or so, a miniature storm stirred the
Louisiana appellate judiciary, when the State Supreme Court
struck down one of the Uniform Rules of the Courts of Appeal
of Louisiana in Wanless v. Louisiana Real Estate Board' and
Jefferson v. Jefferson.2 This article is a reflection of the interest these decisions provoked as to the general nature and the
extent of the rule-making power possessed by the Louisiana
courts.
1.

GENERAL BACKGROUND

During the nineteenth century, it was generally assumed
that the legislature was the proper and principal organ of
government to enact the rules governing practice and procedure
before the courts.3 Court-made rules were recognized as valid,
however, but only to the extent that they were not in conflict
with legislative provisions.
Nevertheless, commencing in the second decade of the present century, leading scholars and practitioners came to general
agreement that rule-making powers with regard to practice and
procedure should preferably be exercised by the courts instead
of by the legislature. 4 In fact, so eminent an authority as Dean
Wigmore suggested in 1928 that the making of rules of procedure was so much a judicial function that, under the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, the legislature "ex*Remarks prepared for the Louisiana Judicial Seminar at the meeting of the
Louisiana judiciary on October 8, 1963.
**Judge, Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, State of Louisiana. Grateful acknowledgment is made of research and other assistance of Thomas W. Sanders,
law clerk to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, for the 1963-1964 term.
1. 243 La. 801, 147 So. 2d 395 (1962).
2. 244 La. 493, 153 So. 2d 368 (1963). See also the companion case, State
v. Lumpkin, 244 La. 510, 153 So. 2d 374 (1963).
3. Harris, Rule-Making Power, 2 F.R.D. 67 (1941) ; Annot., Power of Court
To Prescribe Rules of Pleadings, Practice, or Procedure, 110 A.L.R. 22, 43-50
(1936).
4. VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 91 et seq.
(1949); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION,
IN IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: HANDBOOK, Rule-Making
by the Courts, 51-57 (4th ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as A.B.A. HANDBOOK];
Rule-Making Power of the Courts, 13 A.B.A.J. No. 3 (March 1927).
[555]
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ceeds its constitutional power when it attempts to impose upon
the judiciary any rules for the dispatch of the judiciary's
duties" 5-a view, which I hasten to add, is not in accord with
the general view, and which the good Dean perhaps did not
advance with full seriousness."
Dean Roscoe Pound, for instance, pointed out that the legislative intrusion into regulation of judicial procedure was a relatively recent innovation in legal history. 7 Traditionally, he
noted, the adoption of the rules of practice had been a function
of the high appellate court, which adopted them to regulate
practice both before it and also before the inferior courts subject to its jurisdiction. Dean Pound concluded:
"All experience shows that while statutory procedure runs
to details, becomes elaborate and over-grown, and is of necessity rigid and unyielding, procedure prescribed by rules of
court tends continually to become simple, adapted to its
purposes, and adaptable by the simple process of judicial
'8
amendment to new situations and needs of practice."
Dean (and later Chief Justice) Vanderbilt summarized the
advantages of court-made rules as follows:
"Not only are [court-made rules] made by experts, but they
are interpreted and applied by judges who are sympathetic
with them. Changes may be made whenever occasion may
require without waiting for stated legislative sessions and
without overburdening already overworked legislators. Finally, procedure may be made subsidiary, as it should be,
to the substantive rights of the litigants. The courts may
avoid the snarls of procedural red tape and concentrate on
the real questions at issue."9
In 1938, the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association adopted a report of its Section of Judicial Administration which, among other things, recommended that "practice
and procedure in the courts should be regulated by rules of
court, and . . . to this end the courts should be given full rule5. Wigmore, All Legislative Rules for Judiciary Procedure Are Void Constitutionally, 23 ILL. L. REV. 276 (1928).
6. See Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial Rule-Making:
A Problem in Constitution Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 27 (1958).
7. Pound, The Rule-Making Power of the Courts, 12 A.B.A.J. 599 (1926).
8. Id. at 603.
9. VANDERBILT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN PROCEDURE AND JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION 23 (1952).
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making powers."' 10 This has consistently thereafter remained
the position of this national professional organization.
At this point we should perhaps clarify what is meant by
the full rule-making power which is sought for the courts-or,
more precisely speaking, for the highest court of each jurisdiction. Perhaps we can best do this by quotation from two authoritative reports on the subject:
"By 'rule-making' reference is made not to those subsidiary
or supplementary rules consistent with legislative acts which
every state permits its highest court to provide, but to the
power to amend, alter, and rescind any rule of practice and
procedure, any law to the contrary notwithstanding, which does
not abridge, enlarge, or modify the substantive rights of any
litigant. This is often referred to as complete rule-making
power."" "Thus, full rule-making power in the courts requires
that court procedure be wholly removed from the legislative
12
sphere of authority.'
While authorities on the subject now are in general agreement that the rule-making power should primarily be entrusted
to the courts rather than the legislature, they do not agree that
such judicial rule-making should be totally immune from legislative supervision.
Probably (or at least in the writer's personal opinion) the
better view is that the legislature, which represents the voice
of the people, should have some powers to assure correction in
the event that court-made rules become oppressive or overtechnical insofar as the general public is concerned. 13 After
all, the judicial reforms of the nineteenth century, in sweeping
away cumbersome and inefficient ancient practices and procedures, were largely accomplished by the legislature over the
opposition of the bulk of the bench and bar, who had so to
speak a vested interest against improvement because of their
10. 10 A.B.A. REP. 523

(1938) ; VANDERBILT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
505, Appendix A (1952)
contains full text of report. The A.B.A. HANDBOOK at n.4 emphasizes the association's contemporary strong stand in favor of this recommendation. See also
Miller, "Minimum Judicial Procedural Standards"-How Met in Louisiana, 9
LA. L. REV. 382 (1949).
11. 1 PROJET OF A CONSTITUTION FOR THE STATE OF LOUISIANA, The RuleMODERN

PROCEDURE

AND

JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION

Making Power in the Courts 979 (Louisiana State Law Institute 1954)
after cited as the LA. ST. L. INST. PROJET].
12. A.B.A. HANDBOOK at 55.

[herein-

13. Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial Rule-Making, A
Problem in Constitution Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 27 (1958).
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expertise in the old procedures, and who therefore resisted the
change from them to the more efficient procedures demanded
by reformers.
We must emphasize again that the judicial rule-making
power recommended by the bar associations and the scholars
is not intended to confer on each court, high and low, the power
to make its own rules of pleadings, practice, and procedure.
Rather, this power is sought only for the highest court of the
state, with the rules of procedure and pleading to be adopted
by it to regulate the practice before all courts of the jurisdiction.
As a result of this strong national movement, somewhat
over half the states entrust more or less complete rule-making
power to their highest court.14 In almost all instances, however, the legislature retains some power to modify or disapprove
the court-adopted rules, although the legislative power to do so
is sometimes restricted.

2.

RULE-MAKING POWER IN LOUISIANA

In Louisiana the rule-making power is entrusted primarily
to the legislature, not to the courts. As our Supreme Court
stated, invalidating a court of appeal rule in 1885, no court
"can make and enforce a rule of court that contravenes an express legal [legislative] enactment."' 15
Nevertheless, the principle also has been consistently accepted in Louisiana that, as currently expressed by article 193
of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1960: "A court may adopt
rules for the conduct of judicial business before it, including
those governing matters of practice and procedure which are
not contrary to the rules provided by law." (Emphasis added.)
14. For summary of state provisions, see INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, RULE MAKING POWER OF THE COURTS (1955, Supp. 1962); THIRD
PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

825-96 (N.Y. Legis. Docket 1959:17, 1959).
15. State em rel. Tebault v. The Judges of the Fifth Circuit, 37 La. Ann.
596, 597 (1885). Likewise, in State ex rel. Tooreau v. Posey, 17 La. Ann. 252
(1865), a local court rule was declared invalid as conflicting with a Code of
Practice article. The principle that a court rule is invalid if contravening an
express legislative enactment was recognized as controlling, although the specific
court rule in question was held to be valid, in Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v.
Connolly, 201 La. 342, 9 So. 2d 582 (syllabus 11, 12) (1942) ; Hemler v. United
Gas Public Service Co., 175 La. 285, 143 So. 265 (1932) ; Conery v. His Creditors, 118 La. 864, 43 So. 530 (1907) ; lacoponelli v. LeBlanc, 126 So. 2d 864
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1961).
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It is also accepted that, as stated by article 191 of this Code:
"A court possesses inherently all of the power necessary for
the exercise of its jurisdiction even though not granted expressly by law."
The legislative power over rule-making for courts is not
total, however.
The State Constitution provides that the legislature may not
enact any local or special laws regarding matters of practice
and procedure.1 6 Further, the State Constitution in a very few
limited instances directly authorizes court-made rules as to
In consesome particular procedural or practice matter.'7
quence, the State Supreme Court has declared invalid a procedural statute insofar as conflicting with a court rule adopted
pursuant to the constitutional authorization to regulate the
narrow matter in question.1 8
Of greater significance as a limitation on the legislative
regulation of judicial procedure, at least in the recent decade,
has been the court's very broad construction of the constitutional provision authorizing the appellate and the district courts
"in aid of their respective jurisdictions . . . [to] issue writs
of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto, and all
other needful writs, orders and process."' 9
Based upon a broad construction of this provision, our
Supreme Court in 1959 held unconstitutional a statute prohibiting the judicial issuance of restraining orders or injunctions
in matters pertaining to the withholding or revoking of beer
permits. 20 Partly in reliance upon this provision also, the court
in 1954 had held to be unconstitutional Louisiana's "Little Norris-LaGuardia Act,"' 2 1 which restricted the issuance of restraining orders and injunctions in labor disputes 22-a decision much
criticized at the time as an undue judicial interference with
matters properly (and peculiarly) within the competency of
28
the legislature to regulate.
16. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
17. Miller, "Minimum Judicial Procedural Standards"-How Met in Louisiana, 9 LA. L. REV. 382, 385 (1949).
18. Brott v. New Orleans Land Co., 156 La. 807, 101 So. 150 (1924).
19. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 2.
20. Roksvaag v. Reilly, Collector of Revenue, 237 La. 1094, 113 So. 2d 285
(1959).
21. La. Acts 1934, No. 203, LA. R.S. 23:8401 et seq. (1950).
22. Douglas Public Service Corp. v. Gaspard, 225 La. 972, 74 So. 2d 182
(1954).
23. See id. at 989-93, 74 So. 2d at 188-90 (dissenting opinion of Justice Haw-
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Another, and perhaps the greatest, limitation upon the powers of the legislature to regulate pleading and practice before
the courts is contained in the constitutional grant of supervisory powers to the Louisiana Supreme Court, which will be
24
discussed later in this article.
3.

PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE IN RULE-MAKING POWERS
IN LOUISIANA

In accordance with the judicial reform proposals of the
American Bar Association, the standing recommendation of the
Louisiana State Bar Association is for our State Supreme Court
to be vested with rule-making power to regulate civil procedure
in the courts of this state. The most recent report of the Louisiana bar's committee with interest in the matter is for "a continuation of the efforts to strengthen and expand the rule-mak'25
ing power of the judiciary.
The 1954 projet for a new State Constitution prepared
by the Louisiana State Law Institute contains a proposed section in the judiciary article which provides:
"The legislature may authorize the supreme court to make
and promulgate general and uniform rules of pleading, prac'26
tice, and procedure in all civil actions in the courts.
(Emphasis added.)
The Reporter's comments under this proposal state:
"The Institute has given very careful consideration to the
manner in which the rule-making power should be treated
in the Projet, because in Louisiana matters of practice and
procedure have always been statutory, and the Code of Practice completely covers not only matters of practice in the
thorne) ; The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1953-1954, TermLabor Law, 15 LA. L. REV. 255, 324-27 (1955).
24. See section 4 of this paper infra.
25. 2 LA. ST. L. INST. PROJET 577, referring to a 1950 Committee Report
adopted by the state bar convention that year, and to a 1951 report of the
Standing Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform of the state's bar association, which was re-adopted in 1953. See 1 LA. B.J. 74 (1953). By letter of
March 11, 1964, Colonel Eberhard P. Deutsch, chairman of the Association's
Committee on Law Reform, informed the writer that "there has been no change
in the State Bar Association's position that the Supreme Court should have
rule-making power to regulate procedure in civil cases." He noted, however,
that, "it is perhaps fair to add that the issue has not been a live one in recent
years, no action apparently having been taken by the Association in this regard
since the [1953] report mentioned in your letter."
26. 2 LA. ST. L. INST. PROJET 570 (proposed art. VI, § 10, of new constitution).
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courts but extends to such matters as conservatory writs,
probate matters, and the execution of judgments. It was
decided that any constitutional provision conferring the rulemaking power upon the supreme court should be so phrased
that the integrity of the Code of Practice itself would at all
times be preserved. For this reason it was considered preferable to grant to the supreme court only a supplementary
rule-making power and to provide that the legislature in its
discretion might authorize the court to go further into that
portion of the field of practice and procedure now covered
'27
by the Code of Practice.
In a Law Institute study of judicial rule-making power made
in connection with the projet, the report noted the arguments
in favor of a procedural system provided by the legislature, including "Louisiana's traditional position as a civil law jurisdiction" and the "primary reliance of the Louisiana lawyer upon
positive, legislative law." On the other hand, the report noted
the arguments in favor of the court's exercising rule-making
authority in the matter, such as those stated earlier in this
paper.
The report then noted:
"Perhaps, also, a third alternative may be available: the
adoption initially of a legislative code, with the power and
responsibility for subsequent changes granted to the courts,
subject to the legislative exercise of the police power. ' 28
4.

THE STATE SUPREME COURT'S SUPERVISORY POWERS

The judicial rule-making power in Louisiana cannot be discussed without noting the supervisory jurisdiction of the State
Supreme Court.
The State Constitution provides: "The supreme court shall
have control of, and general supervision over all inferior
courts. '29 Supervisory jurisdiction of this nature was first conferred upon the Supreme Court by the Constitution of 1879, and
the Supreme Court has interpreted this constitutional grant of
power as plenary, unfettered by jurisdictional requirements, and
to be exercised completely within the discretion of that court. 0
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 74.
1 id. at 985-86.
LA. CONST. art. VII, § 10.
See Comment, Supervisory Powers of the Supreme Court of Louisiana
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The Supreme Court has consistently invalidated procedural
statutes which attempt to inhibit or prevent resort to its supervisory jurisdiction by parties before the lower courts.
Recently, for instance, in State v. Gatlin,3 1 on such ground
the court held to be invalid a procedural statute which provided
that a trial court's denial of a motion for a directed verdict
was not subject to review by any appellate court. In fact, even
though unconstitutionality had not been pleaded, the court
nevertheless noticed of its own motion the unconstitutionality
of the statute and stated that "when its jurisdiction is invoked,
the Court has the duty to strike down any legislation which
interferes with or curtails plenary power vested in it by the
32
Constitution."
In the Gatlin decision, reference was also made to several
other decisions, such as State v. Doucet,3 3 which had held invalid
various articles of the Code of Criminal Procedure insofar as
they sought to prevent any application to the supervisory powers of the Supreme Court to review interlocutory rulings in
criminal proceedings.
We note the supervisory powers of the Supreme Court in
connection with rule-making authority, because in several jurisdictions the state's highest court prescribes the rules of practice and procedure for the trial and other inferior courts by
virtue of a "supervisory control" given the high court by constitutional provisions similar to that granting supervisory power
34
to our own Supreme Court.
In a 1949 survey made for the National Conference of Judicial Councils, it was indicated that court-made rules prevailed
over an inconsistent legislative enactment in at least four of the
thirteen states in which the highest court promulgates court
rules pursuant to supervisory powers similar to Louisiana's.3 5
Nevertheless, such a constitutional grant to the courts of ruleover Inferior Courts, 34 TUL. L. REV. 165 (1959) for excellent history and
summary of the Supreme Court's use of these constitutional supervisory powers.
31. 241 La. 321, 129 So. 2d 4 (1961).
32. Id. at 336, 129 So. 2d at 9.
33. 199 La. 276, 5 So. 2d 894 (1942).
34. THIRD PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE 830 (N.Y. Legis. Docket 1959:17, 1959).
35. VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 135-37
(1949). These states seem to be Colorado, New Mexico, North Dakota, and South
Dakota, by comparison of the listing of states with constitutional supervisory
powers with the listing of states in which court-made rules prevail over contrary
legislation.
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making authority under its supervisory powers has usually been
viewed as a power to be exercised concurrently by the court
with the legislature.3 6 It is usually exercised by the state's highest court only after the enactment of legislation "enabling" the
court to do so and indicating the legislature's withdrawal from
37
the field.
For instance, the New Mexico Constitution provides that
its Supreme Court "shall have a superintending control over all
(This is quite similar to Louisiana's aboveinferior courts." 3
quoted constitutional provision that our own high court "shall
have control of and general supervision over all inferior
courts.") 39 In 1936, in affirming a conviction and death sentence based upon a short form indictment authorized by the
court-adopted rules of pleading and practice, the New Mexico
Supreme Court held that, by virtue of its constitutionally
granted "superintending control," lodged in itself was the "power to provide rules of pleading, practice, and procedure for
the conduct of litigation in the district courts, as well as the
rules of appellate procedure. ' 40 The New Mexico Supreme
Court further held that rules of procedure for the lower courts
"were promulgated.., by this court in the exercise of an inherent power lodged in us to prescribe such rules of practice, pleading and procedure as will facilitate the administration of justice." 41
i
According to Dean Vanderbilt, the provisions granting supervisory jurisdiction to the supreme courts of several of the
other states, including Louisiana, "have had little effect due
[only] to the unwillingness of the courts to assert themselves
or the failure of the bar to stir them into action." Dean Vanderbilt concluded that, whether or not the legislature voluntarily
vacates the field of judicial procedure, "only the will to act is
needed to have such provisions furnish the basis for upholding
the right of the court of last resort to make rules for other
42
courts."
36.

THIRD PRELIMINARY

AND PROCEDURE 830 (N.Y.

REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PRACTICE

Legis. Docket 1959:17, 1959).

37. Ibid.
38. N.M. CONST. art. 6, § 3.
39. LA. CONST. art. Vii, § 10.
40. State v. Roy, 40 N.M. 397, 60 P.2d 646, 662 (1936). See especially id.
at 421-22, 60 P.2d at 660-62.
41. Id. at 420, 60 P.2d at 660.
42. VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 136
(1949).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIV

Despite the Dean's assertion, the constitutional grant of
supervisory powers to our State Supreme Court in Louisiana
cannot reasonably, it seems to the writer, be claimed as intended
to confer exclusive rule-making powers in that tribunal. The
consistent course of contemporaneous construction by the Louisiana courts over the decades has recognized and respected the
legislative preemption of the rule-making area, through the Code
of Practice, the Code of Civil Procedure, and other procedural
statutes.
On the other hand, almost certainly the constitutional supervisory powers of the Louisiana Supreme Court are an adequate
constitutional basis to sustain the promulgation of court-adopted
rules of practice and procedure, if, as in several states, the legislature should by specific enactment withdraw from the field
and confirm in the Supreme Court the right to promulgate such
43
rules.
5.

WANLESS AND JEFFERSON: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL
FRUSTRATION

The state Constitution, as interpreted by our Supreme
Court, provides that the rules of practice pertaining to the Supreme Court apply to the courts of appeal until otherwise provided by the State Constitution, by statute, or by the rules of
the courts of appeal themselves. 44 A further constitutional
provision states that each court of appeal45"shall provide by rule
for the giving . . . notice" of judgment.
The latter provision furnished the basis by which the courts
of appeal in 1960 claimed the constitutional authority to adopt
a court rule providing that the delay within which to apply for
a rehearing commenced with the date of mailing of the notice
of judgment, rather than with the date of receipt of it by coun43. See, e.g., the New Mexico enactment quoted at full in State v. Roy, 40
N.M. 397, 406-07, 60 P.2d at 652. See also sources cited at note 14 supra.
44. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 27, as interpreted by Cox v. Shreveport Packing
Co., 212 La. 325, 31 So. 2d 815 (1947), affirming 28 So. 2d 617 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1946) on this procedural point. The case was later affirmed on the merits.
213 La. 53, 34 So. 2d 373 (1948).
In the interest of completeness, we should at this time refer to earlier difficulties under prior constitutional provisions experienced by the courts of appeal
in adopting valid rehearing rules or practices. See Smith v. Cumberland, 126
La. 168, 52 So. 255 (1910) ; Hargis v. Ozone Lbr. Co., 122 La. 126, 47 So. 432
(1908) ; Brooks v. Dolard, 1 McGloin 279 (La. App. 1880).
45. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 24.
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sel. 46 It was this rule which the Supreme Court recently held
v. Louisiana Real Estate Board47 and Jefferinvalid in Wanless
8
4

son v. Jefferson.

The prior history of the attempts of the courts of appeal
to adopt a similar rule may be instructive as to the snares and
pitfalls involved in detailed constitutional or statutory regulation of rules of court procedure.
The invalidated rule was essentially based upon construing
the constitutional requirement that notice be "given" as intending to provide that term with its broad meaning of "issuance"
of notice, i. e., a meaning which does not necessarily require
the actual "receipt" of this notice before the delay for rehearing
commences. 49 The general purpose of the rule was to have
the courts rather than the litigants control the date within
which the delay begins to run,50 a concept reflected by numerous
other modern procedural statutes providing that notice is effective as of the date of mailing rather than of receipt. 51 (Litigants otherwise may retard the commencement of the delay by
refusing or simply neglecting to accept the notice sent to a post
office box.)
Conceding that there are persuasive arguments against
such a rule,5 2 it nevertheless should be possible for a court system to adopt such a rule, when, as here, in its best judgment,
concurred in by bar rules advisory committees, the courts' procedure will be thus improved.
46. Uniform Rules of the Courts of Appeal of Louisiana, as adopted in 1960
and as revised in 1961, rule XI, § 1. In 1963 the offending rule was amended
so as to accord with the Supreme Court's subsequent ruling that it was invalid
as originally drafted.

47. 243 La. 801, 147 So. 2d 395 (1962).
48. 244 La. 493, 153 So. 2d 368 (1963).
49. See 38 C.J.S. verlo give 926 (1943) ; FUNK & WAGNALL, HANDBOOK OF
SYNONYMS, verbo give 220 (rev. ed. 1947) ; RODALE, THE SYNONYM FINDER, verbo
give 460 (1961) ; WEBSTER, UNABRIDGED NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, verbo
give 1060 (2d ed. 1959).
50. See excellent analysis of entire question in Comment, Delay for Filing

Applications for Rehearings in Courts of Appeal, 23 LA. L. REV. 589 (1963).
See also Lacaze v. Hardee, 199 La. 566, 574, 6 So. 2d 663, 665

(1942) : "[I]f

the delay for filing an application for rehearing is held not to begin on the day
that the notice of judgment is mailed to the attorney of record but the day after
he receives actual notice thereof, it would be confusing and difficult for the court
to determine, for all practical purposes, when the delay for filing an application
for rehearing had expired."

51. See, e.g., LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 1914 (rendition of interlocutory judgment),

1974 (delay to apply for a new trial), 2087 (delay to take

devolutive appeal), 2123 (delay to take a suspensive appeal)
52. See Comment, 23 LA. L. REV. 589 (1963).

(1960).
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Indeed, the Louisiana Second Circuit had earlier adopted
a similar rule, which the Supreme Court invalidated in 194253
on the ground that it offended a constitutional provision that
"no delay shall run until such notice shall have been given. ' 54
Likewise, for the same constitutional reason, in 1955 the Supreme Court invalidated a 1954 statute providing for the delay
for rehearings in the courts of appeal to commence with the
"rendition" of judgment. 55
In connection with the 1958 constitutional revision of the
appellate court structure, the courts of appeal therefore secured
a 1958 constitutional amendment striking out the former constitutional provision that the delay could not run until the notice
was given to counsel.56
In reliance upon removal of the previous constitutional
bar to the validity of such a rule, the new Uniform Rules of
the Courts of Appeal of 1960 provided that notice should be
deemed given by deposit in the certified or registered mail,
for purposes of commencing the delay within which to apply
57
for rehearing.
In striking down this court rule as invalid in Wanless and
Jefferson, the Supreme Court adhered to a previous interpretation by it that the "giving" of notice was intended to require
the actual receipt of this notice rather than merely the issuance
or mailing of it. Essentially, however, the Supreme Court also
held that the court of appeal rule was invalid as in conflict
with procedural statutes adopted in 1960 providing that rehearings must be filed in the courts of appeal within fourteen days
after notice is "given" (i. e., "received," according to the mean58
ing ascribed by the Supreme Court to the term.)
53. Lacaze v. Hardee, 199 La. 566, 6 So. 2d 663 (1942).
54. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 24, prior to its amendment in 1958.
55. LA. R.S. 13:4446, as amended and reenacted by La. Acts 1954, No. 51
(Supp.

1963)

held invalid as to the First and Second Circuits by Reeves

v.

Department of Highways, 228 La. 653, 83 So. 2d 889 (1955) ; Mid-State Tile
Co. v. Chaudoir, 228 La. 634, 83 So. 2d 654 (1955). It is to be remembered that,
prior to the 1958 constitutional revision, the delay in the other intermediate
appellate courts-the Court of Appeal for Orleans -commenced

with the rendi-

tion of the judgment, as it still does in the case of the Supreme Court.

See

Official Revision Comments, in LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2166 (1960).

See also, e.g., Antoine v. Consolidated-Vultee Aircraft Corp., 217 La. 251, 46
So.2d 260 (1950).
56. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 24, as amended by La. Acts 1958, No. 561. See
Tate, Proceedings in Appellate Courts, 35 TUL. L. REV. 585, 593-95 (1961).

57. See note 46 supra.
58. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PRocEDuRE art. 2166

(1950), as amended, La. Acts 1960, No. 38.

(1960); LA.

R.S. 13:4446B
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To recapitulate: in 1954 the courts had secured enactment
of a procedural statute which provided that the delay for rehearing in the courts of appeal should commence with the rendition of judgment. In 1960, however, the provisions of the
1954 statute were repealed-in reliance upon the 1955 Supreme
Court decision invalidating it because of the pre-1958 constitutional provision.
The situation thus was that, while in 1958 the Constitution
was amended so as to remove the bar to the validity of the
1954 statute, the 1954 statute was subsequently amended in
1960 so as to comply with the constitutional requirement as it
existed before the 1958 amendment!
At the present time, further efforts have been abandoned to
accomplish the desired rules change, which a Law Institute
study indicates might require amendment both of the State Constitution as well as of the procedural statutes relating to the
matter.
The enormous amount of effort required of the various
consultative bodies, and of various organs of the state government, to effect this minor procedural change, and the uncertainties and delays experienced in the meanwhile by the litigants
in the process of securing interpretation of the various legislative and judicial attempts to meet the problem- certainly seem
to illustrate the assertion of those who claim that detailed statutory regulation of court procedure is generically cumbersome
and ineffective.
A better system, it might seem, should permit the tailoring
of the court rule, in advance of its promulgation, to meet constitutional or other objections-and non-adoption of the rule
if this is not possible. This approach is possible if the court
rule is drafted and promulgated by the same court system which
will administer and interpret it. The present system, to the
contrary, requires the litigants to suffer while ex post facto
interpretations are being sought at the possible expense of substantive rights and with certain delay in the enforcement
thereof.
6. CONCLUSION
The national and state bar associations have recommended
that the rule-making power be conferred upon the State Su-
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preme Court. The intended purpose is that needed procedural
improvements may be made by the court system itself, instead
of going through the sometimes wasteful, piecemeal, and sporadic process of amending procedural statutes, often productive
of litigation and delay and confusion.
The writer is not convinced that such a transfer of rulemaking powers is necessarily desirable at this time. On the
whole, with the able ministrations of the Law Institute and
Judicial Council and the respect shown by the legislature for
these law-improvement agencies, statutory rule-making has
worked well in Louisiana. However, the Wanless and Jefferson
saga did bring home to some observers the validity of the bar
association criticism that there may be much waste motion and
inefficient judicial administration inherent in legislative rulemaking for the judicial system.
If serious consideration is to be given to the bar association
recommendations, we should also consider briefly certain practical questions that may arise in connection with the proposals.
If adopted, the transfer of the rule-making authority from
the legislature to the Supreme Court could possibly be by an
express constitutional amendment. However, consideration also
can be given to effecting such a transfer through simple enabling legislation based upon the supervisory power already
granted to our State Supreme Court by our Constitution.
By whatever means any such transfer of rule-making
authority may be accomplished, the legislature should, in the
writer's opinion, retain general supervisory powers over the
rule-making process. In the future, a less progressive court
system might take too parochial a view of the regulation of
judicial procedure, a matter which is after all the concern of
our entire people, not just of the bench and bar.
Professor Levin of Pennsylvania, in his excellent article on
legislative control over judicial rule-making, surveys the problem and makes some excellent suggestions for retaining general
legislative control. 59 Again, as in the case of the Federal Rules
59. Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control over Judicial Rule-Making:
A Problem in Constitution Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 107 (1958):
"[A] balance of powers might be established, we believe, by a constitutional
provision essentially as follows:
"1. The supreme court shall make rules governing the administration, practice and procedure, including evidence, of all courts in the state.

"2. Such rules, or any statute enacted under this paragraph, may be re-
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of Civil Procedure, the rule-making and rule-amendment functions might be exercised primarily by the courts with, however,
a provision that rules must be submitted to the legislature for
a period in advance of their effective date, so that they will
become operative only if not disapproved by the legislature
during this waiting period 0 Or perhaps the legislature could
delegate the rule-making function to the courts with certain
subject matters excepted, retaining general veto powers still
over matters not excepted.
For those who treasure our magnificent Code of Civil Procedure and who fear any disturbance of its integrity should
the rule-making power be transferred from the legislature to
the courts, a common provision in the enactments by which the
legislature withdraws from the rule-making field is to the
effect that existing procedural statutes remain in force and
have effect as rules only until modified or suspended by the
judicial rule-making authority."'
If this transfer of the rule-making function should take
place in Louisiana, modifications in the Code and other procedural regulations from time to time would most probably
take place in approximately the same manner as they do now.
That is, any recommended change would be made only after
careful study by the Louisiana State Law Institute and consultation with bar and judicial advisory bodies.
The chief difference would be that the changes would
be promulgated by court rule, instead of being enacted as legislation through formal legislative procedures at the next legislative session.
Any Supreme Court regulation of court rules will still provide, subject only to the general provisions which that tribunal
adopts, for the courts of appeal and other inferior tribunals
to adopt, as now, their own rules to regulate practice before
pealed, amended or supplemented by the legislature by two-thirds vote of the
members elected to each house, and any such enactment shall have the force and
effect of statute during the six years next following the date of its taking effect

and shall thereafter have effect as rule of court until repealed or amended by
th supreme court or by the legislature.
"In consideration of any bill proposing an enactment under this section, the

chief justice of the state shall be given opportunity to be heard."
60. 64 Stat. 158 (1950), 28 U.S.C.A. § 2072 (1959). See BARRON & HOLTZOFF,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6, at 24 et 8eq. (1960).

61. See New Mexico enactment to which reference is made at note 43 supra.

See also

THIRD PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE 830 (N.Y. Legis. Docket 1959:17, 1959).
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them. A general procedural provision governing the entire
judicial system may prevent the adoption by a court of a desired rules change, such as that described above sought by the
courts of appeal. If so, amendment of the general provision
should be easier to accomplish-if genuinely in the public interest as attested by the Law Institute and Judicial Council study
and recommendations.
If accompanied by study and consultation as above outlined,
procedural changes should be in the public interest when made.
A procedural change will be adopted by the same court system
which administers it, so therefore its application and interpretation should be less productive of the litigation and confusion
which has sometimes resulted from procedural legislation in the
past.
These, then, are the advantages which invite our consideration of a transfer of the rule-making authority from the legislature to the courts.
Against change in rule-making function, on the contrary,
is the undoubted success that Louisiana has on the whole experienced with legislative rule-making. This success has been
produced largely by the confidence the legislature has shown
in the judgment of the Law Institute and of the Judicial Council, as well as by the great ability and vision shown to date by
these official organs for the continuous improvement of law
and of judicial administration.
Further, although the necessity for legislation approving
a rules-change has to some extent been a cumbersome procedure
inevitably involving subsequent litigation during which the
courts interpret the procedural enactment, this bilateral exercise of the rule-making function has also provided a safeguard
against possible arbitrary abuse through the unchecked unilateral exercise of such function by the courts alone.
At any rate, the recent developments in modern procedural
thought concerning the rule-making powers deserve the attention of the entire legal profession in Louisiana.

